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This  paper  aims  to  explain  the  large  premium  paid  on  common  (voting)  shares  relative  to 
preferred (non-voting) shares in the Russian stock market. Empirical analysis focuses on two 
main explanations relating the premium either to the voting right attached to common shares or 
to differences in liquidity between the two classes of stock. Two avenues through which the 
right to vote may give rise to the premium are distinguished. First, the presence of private 
benefits of control and the possibility of control contests may make the votes held by small 
investors pivotal, and therefore valuable. Second, non-voting shareholders may be expropriated 
as a class by voting shareholders. Regression analysis of RTS stock exchange data from 1997-
2005 provides support for the control contest model of the premium as well as for the liquidity 
argument. The study finds no evidence that the premium is related to expropriation of preferred 
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Introduction 
In the traditional theory of finance, the value of securities is associated with future cash flows 
discounted at the rate that reflects their risk. In other words, the value of securities is assumed to 
depend on the pecuniary benefits they are entitled to by law or by contract. Other properties of 
securities, for example, voting rights attached to company shares, are considered as having no 
effect on their prices.  
Valuation of dual class stock in the Russian stock market seems to be at odds with this 
assumption. In Russia, companies are allowed to issue two classes of stock – called common 
and preferred shares – with the right to vote and entitlement to dividend being the two major 
differences between them. Common shares bear one vote each while preferred shares are non-
voting  (except  for  a  few  special cases  that are stipulated  in  the corporate law).  The  latter, 
however, typically have superior dividend rights: the dividend on preferred share is bounded 
below by the dividend on common share. Despite the disadvantageous position of common 
shares  with  respect  to  dividends,  they  have  been  traded  with  a  substantial  premium,  up  to 
several hundred percent, over the price of preferred shares.
1 This is illustrated in Table 1 and 
Table 2 that provide data on share prices and dividends for three large companies belonging to 
three  major  sectors  of  the  economy  (the  oil  and  gas  industry,  power  utilities  and 
telecommunications).  
As in the Russian corporate law the only obvious disadvantage of preferred shares is the 
absence of the voting right, it is natural to ask if this can explain the premium attached to 
common shares. Indeed, in the light of the extensive international literature on valuation of dual 
class stock the very fact that preferred shares in Russia are valued less than common stock is 
hardly surprising. Numerous studies from other countries document a positive voting premium 
which  ranges  from  between  5.4  percent  and  82  percent,  and  is  below  50  percent  in  most 
countries (Becht et al., 2002). What makes the Russian case different is the unusually high 
magnitude of the price differential. Also, its volatility is remarkable: the premium was relatively 
low in 1996 and 1997, increased dramatically soon after the outburst of the financial crisis in   3
August 1998 and gradually declined since 2000. Figure 1 shows the dynamics of the premium 
for the selected three companies as well as the dynamics of the RTS Stock Exchange
2 index 
between 1996 and 2005. As long as the premium in Russia can be interpreted as reflecting the 
value of the voting right, the observed volatility casts doubts on the suppositions that the value 
of a vote is stable in time on the country level (see e.g., Nenova, 2003). 
Another reason why the Russian case may be of interest is the fact that the dual class 
structure  of  corporate  stock  emerged  exogenously  due  to  specific  regulations  concerning 
privatization  of  former  state-owned  enterprises.  Thus,  the  problem  of  endogeneity  of  the 
decision to issue different types of shares, which recent studies attempt to address (see e.g., 
Pajuste, 2005), is of less concern.
3 This makes the Russian stock market a potentially attractive 
testing ground for theoretical explanations of the differential valuation of dual class stock. 
The existing literature on dual class stock in Russia is scarce. Willer (1997) interprets 
the premium on common shares as evidence of the prime importance of control rights and 
suggests that its decline in 1995-1996 testifies to that firms start to honour shareholder rights 
and regulatory progress is made. Characterizing Russia as a Wild West of corporate control, 
Goetzmann et al. (2003) investigate as to whether the size of the premium can be explained by 
the risk of expropriation of preferred shareholders as a class, i.e. by actions that ultimately divert 
cash  flows  from  preferred  shareholders  to  common  ones.  Using  a  simple  perpetual  growth 
model and assuming some plausible levels of the interest rate and company growth rate, the 
authors find it difficult to justify the current level of the premium by the risk of expropriation 
unless some improbable disaster scenarios involving an outright transfer of cash flow from 
preferred shareholders to common ones are considered. However, possible alternative and/or 
complementary explanations suggested in the literature – such as inferior liquidity of preferred 
shares – are not considered by Goetzmann et al. (2003). The authors assert that these additional 
explanations do not seem reasonable, but do not provide any supporting evidence for this claim.  
The aim of this study is to test alternative explanations for the dual class stock price 
differential in Russia. It proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses how dual class stock is 
issued  and treated in  the Russian  corporate  law.  Section  3  focuses  on the explanations for   4
differential valuation of dual-class stock that are proposed in the literature: the control contest 
model  of the  voting  premium,  the expropriation  of non-voting  shareholders as  a  class,  and 
liquidity differences between the two classes of stock. Section 4 presents empirical evidence 
from econometric analysis. Section 5 concludes the analysis. 
 
The legal status of common and preferred shares in Russia
4 
Dual  class  shares  were  authorized  in  Russia  in  1992  with  the  launch  of  the  privatization 
programme.  The  programme  established  three  basic  methods  of  privatizing  state-owned 
enterprises as well as stipulated a standard corporate charter, which large state-owned firms 
offered to privatization had to adopt. One of the methods implied re-establishment of state 
enterprises as companies with up to 25 percent of their charter capital represented by preferred 
(non-voting) shares, which were then distributed to company employees and retirees for free. 
While managers and employees – who had a strong say in determining the way of privatizing of 
their enterprises – usually preferred the other methods which allocated them controlling blocks 
of voting shares rather than non-voting stock, in large and capital intensive enterprises they 
were  unable  to  accumulate  enough  funds  to  buy  out  51  percent  of  shares,  and  therefore 
privatization involving dual class stock issue was implemented (see e.g., Hare and Muravyev, 
2003). Thus, the privatization regulations made firm size and capital intensity the major factors 
triggering the issue of dual class stock in Russia. 
The legal status of the two classes of shares was initially specified in the standard 
corporate charter, which, with few exceptions, was common to all recently privatized firms. 
While the rights attached to common shares were quite similar to those existing in most other 
economies (they are basically restricted to the right to vote at shareholder meetings and the right 
to receive dividends, which are indefinite), the status of preferred shares was peculiar. First, 
they could never make up more than 25 percent of the charter capital and had to have the same 
par value as common shares. Second, minimum annual dividends on preferred stock were set at 
the level of 10 percent of company’s net profit (hereafter the 10 percent dividend rule). Third,   5
the dividend on preferred shares could not be lower and had to be paid before the dividend on 
common shares. Fourth, preferred shareholders were granted superior rights in the event of 
company liquidation. Fifth, preferred shares could be temporarily enfranchised. The standard 
charter endowed preferred shareholders with the right to vote on decisions that involved their 
“class rights” (changes in corporate charters concerning dividends, rights in liquidation, etc.) as 
well as with the right to vote on every decision in case the dividend on preferred shares was not 
paid or was not paid in full. Moreover, preferred shareholders were even granted a vetoing 
power on decisions that involved their rights – such decisions had to be approved by two thirds 
of the votes of preferred shareholders attending shareholder meeting. Finally, few corporate 
charters contained the provision that preferred shares could be converted into common ones, 
sometimes under certain conditions such as completion of privatization. 
A more flexible regime for preferred shares was introduced with the enactment of the 
law on joint-stock companies in July 1996. Most importantly, the law did not make the vetoing 
power  of  preferred  shareholders  a  mandatory  rule.  Now,  in  case  of  corporate  charter 
amendments that involved interests of preferred shareholders, the law granted them just one 
vote per share and did not institute the norm that they could vote separately from common 
shareholders. Since votes of common and preferred shareholders were counted together rather 
than separately and preferred shareholders never held more than 25 percent of equity, as a group 
they could not veto any resolution of shareholder meetings, even those requiring supermajority 
approval. Required to quickly adjust their charters to meet the new regulations, many companies 
changed the articles referring to preferred shares using exact wordings from the new law; others 
were more selective and changed only those provisions that were in a direct conflict with the 
law.
5 The result was the emergence of companies with and without the vetoing power provision 
in their charters. 
Not less important, the law did not institute the 10 percent dividend rule. Nor did it 
require that the dividend on preferred share could not be lower than the dividend on common 
one. Firms that issued preferred stock were required “to determine the dividend on preferred 
share”, either as a fixed amount, a percentage of net profit or another precise way. This loose   6
provision,  especially  when  combined  with  the  loss  of  the  vetoing  power  by  preferred 
shareholders, explains the considerable variation in the dividend rights attached to preferred 
stock of different companies.  
In 2001, several important changes were introduced in the corporate law in order to 
improve minority shareholders protection. A crucial change affecting preferred shareholders 
was that they regained the vetoing power on corporate charter amendments that involved their 
interests. Starting from January 2002 such changes have to be approved by 75 percent of the 
votes of preferred shareholders participating in the shareholder meeting, and these votes are to 
be counted separately from the votes of common shareholders. 
To summarize, since their introduction in 1992, preferred shares have enjoyed a number 
of advantages of a pecuniary character over common shares. The apparent disadvantages have 
been the absence of the voting right and the possibility of “class rights” changes detrimental to 
preferred shareholders (especially until 2002 when the vetoing power of preferred shareholders 
was instituted in the law). In order words, preferred shareholders have presumably born an 
additional risk, namely the risk of expropriation by common shareholders. 
 
Theoretical framework 
The  existing  literature  usually  relates  differential  valuation  of  dual  class  stock  either  to 
differential voting rights or to the unequal liquidity of these shares. The liquidity argument 
simply states that a less liquid class of shares should be traded with a discount. The voting right 
explanation  relies  either  on  the  control  contest  model  that  originates  from  the  analysis  by 
Grossman and Hart (1988) and its extensions in Zingales (1995) and Rydqvist (1996), among 
others, or on the assumption that non-voting shareholders can be expropriated by voting ones. 
The control contest model of the voting premium is by far the most common explanation in the 
literature.  
   7
The control contest model of the voting premium  
The cornerstone of the control contest model is the so-called private benefits of control that can 
be appropriated by the party that controls the firm. Besides dividends and capital gains, which 
are shared with other shareholders, the controlling shareholders (or managers) can benefit from 
high wages, transfer pricing, and payments-in-kind or simply receive psychological benefits 
from being in control of the firm. These benefits are often extracted to the detriment of minority 
shareholders, implying expropriation of the latter. Minority shareholders, however, cannot do 
much about such expropriation due to the non-verifiable nature of the control benefits. If these 
private benefits could be evaluated they would immediately loose their “privacy” and minority 
shareholders could bring in a lawsuit against the corporation or the controlling owner.
6  
The market price of shares reflects their value to the marginal investor who has no 
means to enjoy private benefits of control. Why then is the voting stock priced at a premium? 
The theory suggests that investors attach some value to the voting right as long as there is 
competition among different management teams to  acquire these votes. Voting shares have 
higher prices in the stock market since even a small fraction of them may be pivotal in a control 
contest, while non-voting shares are irrelevant in battles for control. Consequently, the voting 
premium reflects the price a potential bidder would be willing to pay to atomistic holders of 
voting stock in order to establish control over the company; and thus may be interpreted as a 
measure of the private benefits of control.  
A formal model of the premium is provided by Zingales (1995). Assuming that 1) a 
company has two classes of shares which are identical in all respects except for the right to vote 
(one class has all votes), 2) there is competition for control over the firm among two parties 
(contested tender offer), 3) a bid involves all shares of the company, both voting and non-
voting, though they may have different prices, Zingales shows that the voting premium is equal 
to the ratio between the value of the private benefits of control and the value of cash flow rights 
(the present value of corporate benefits distributed pro rata to shareholders) divided by the 
fraction of voting shares in the company’s equity. Formally this can be expressed as follows:    8
 
    VP
CC = (B/y) (1/p),                (1) 
where  VP
CC  denotes  the  voting  premium  in  the  event  of  a  control  contest  (the  difference 
between the price of the voting share and the price of the non-voting one divided by the latter), 
B  measures the size of the private benefits of control, y indicates the value of cash flow rights, 
and p represents the proportion of voting shares outstanding. The intuition behind p is that when 
the fraction of voting shares becomes larger, so does the number of shares among which the 
benefits of control are to be distributed. 
This model applies only in the event of a control contest. Zingales (1995) then argues 
that the voting premium observed in daily trading should reflect the expectation of different 
prices of the two classes of stock in case of such an event. Therefore, it should be equal to the 
voting premium during a control contest times the probability (Ф) that such an event will take 
place: 
        VP = Ф VP
CC = Ф (B/y) (1/p).            (2) 
Thus, according to the model, there are three major determinants of the size of the voting 
premium: the relative size of the private benefits of control (B/y), the probability of a control 
contest, and the fraction of the voting stock in the company’s equity. The probability Ф of a 
contested tender offer directly depends on the ownership structure of companies: it is zero if a 
company has a majority shareholder, positive but small if there is one large owner and all other 
shareholders are small, and large when there are multiple large shareholders with similar stakes 
while the remaining shares are distributed among small owners.  
Though the assumptions of the control contest model do not seem very realistic in the 
institutional environments that prevail in the world (e.g., concentrated rather than dispersed 
ownership and absence of an active market for corporate control in many countries; see Denis 
and  McConnel,  2002;  Becht,  2002;  La  Porta  et  al.,  1999),  it  has  been  supported  in  many 
empirical studies and remains the dominant explanation of the voting premium. For example, 
Zingales  (1994) reports that the  voting  premium  in Italy  is  directly  related  to  the  value  of   9
control and varies according to the ownership structure and the concentration of the voting 
rights. Rydqvist (1996) focuses on the link between the voting premium and the ownership 
structure in Swedish companies and reports that the voting premium is larger in companies 
where the two biggest blockholders are of equal size – which increases the probability of a 
control contest – than in firms where the first blockholder is much larger than the second one. 
The  control  contest  model  also  underlies  the  analysis  of  the  voting  premium  by  Nicodano 
(1998), who focuses on the effect of pyramiding – an additional deviation from the one-share-
one-vote rule – in Italy; by Hoffmann-Burchardi (1999), who studies the role of institutional and 
regulatory environment in Germany and finds lower voting premium in companies that accepted 
the mandatory bid rule; by Nenova (2003) whose innovative study focuses on the institutional 
determinants of the value of controlling blocks using a cross-country sample of firms.  
 
Expropriation of preferred shareholders as a class 
As mentioned in the previous section, the extraction of private benefits of control often, though 
not always, involves expropriation of minority shareholders. The control contest model sketched 
above assumes that the extraction of private benefits is detrimental for voting shareholders to 
the same extent as to non-voting ones – but the former are able to recover at least a part of the 
loss if control over the company can be contested. 
However, it is also possible that expropriation only concerns preferred shareholders. 
This implies diverting cash flows from non-voting shareholders to voting ones either through 
explicit changes in the corporate charter that reduce cash flow rights of the former group or 
through more sophisticated techniques such as share swaps in mergers (see e.g., Goetzmann et 
al. 2003). This scenario is not implausible: voting shareholders may have both incentives and 
power to make such decisions. Given the complete separation between cash flow rights and 
control rights in case of non-voting shares, particularly strong protection may be needed for 
non-voting shareholders. As in the general case with minority shareholders, this may come from 
both legal and extra-legal mechanisms.    10
Usually  this  problem  is  explicitly  addressed  in  the  corporate  law,  for  example,  by 
strictly linking the dividend and other features of non-voting shares to the analogous features of 
voting shares. In more flexible regulatory environments that permit varying the rights attached 
to non-voting stock, the law typically requires a majority consent of the holders of those shares 
when a change in their “class rights” is on the agenda (i.e., the shareholders are granted a 
conditional right to vote). Yet it is plausible that these mechanisms do not always ensure equal 
protection of non-voting and voting shareholders. Explicit legal norms may simply fail to cover 
all eventualities. The conditional right to vote may also be ineffective due to the free rider 
problem  facing  non-voting  shareholders,  as  they  are  usually  quite  dispersed.  Indeed,  non-
negligible blocks of voting shares are often held in order to exert some influence over the 
company. In contrast, there is little reason for holding non-voting shares concentrated since the 
conditional right to vote is rarely activated and is always limited in scope.  
 
Differences in liquidity 
Since contributions by Stoll and Whaley (1983) and Amihud and Mendelson (1986), the role of 
liquidity for valuation of securities is widely acknowledged: higher liquidity ceteris paribus 
contributes to higher prices of securities. The logic is simple: the less liquid security should 
have  higher  trading  costs  which  should  be  reflected  in  a  lower  price  of  that  instrument. 
Moreover, the effect of trading costs is not of second-order and may be considerable since these 
costs have to be incurred every time the asset is traded.  
Liquidity is an elusive concept: there is no single measure that captures all essential 
aspects of liquidity (Amihud and Mendelson, 1991).
7  It is even more complicated to judge 
relative liquidity of dual class shares. For example, these classes typically constitute unequal 
proportions of company equity and are issued in different numbers. All other things being equal, 
the larger the fraction of a particular class in company equity, the higher its liquidity compared 
with the other class. However, for corporate control reasons voting shares may be held more 
concentrated than non-voting stock. Hence, a large share of voting stock may be out of trade in   11
the market. As a result, when the fraction of non-voting stock is relatively small, the number 
and the volume of transactions may be larger for common stock while the ratio of the number of 
shares traded in the stock exchange to the total number of shares may be larger for preferred 
stock.  
Empirical evidence of the effect of liquidity on dual-class stock prices is mixed. For 
example, Smith and Amoako-Adu (1995) find no compelling evidence that liquidity (measured 
by turnover) matters for the voting premium in Canada. No effect of liquidity measured by the 
average trading volume in the superior class divided by the average trading volume in the 
inferior voting class is reported by Zingales (1995) for the US and Chung and Kim (1999) for 
Korea.  However,  Nenova  (2003)  reports  a  significant  effect  of  liquidity  (proxied  by  log-
difference in turnover and bid-ask spread) on the value of corporate votes from cross-country 
data analysis and warns against biases that may arise if liquidity is not properly controlled for.  
 
Empirical analysis  
Data and sample description 
The sample for this study was constructed to include Russian companies whose common and 
preferred shares were traded in the RTS between 1997 and 2005.
8 To be included in the sample, 
each company had to satisfy the following criteria: 
1)  it issued two classes of stock; 
2)  its common and preferred stock were listed in the RTS stock exchange;  
3)  the dividend on preferred share was bounded below by the dividend on common 
share; 
4)  both types of stock were simultaneously traded in at least one of the reference 
periods, which are defined as February 10 – March 15 each year. 
While the first two restrictions are obvious, the latter two may require explanation. The 
third restriction is essential as it excludes preferred shares that are very dissimilar to common 
ones  with  respect  to  dividend  flows,  in  particular,  preferred  shares  with  fixed  rather  than   12
variable dividend. The fourth restriction implies the use of annual rather than semi-annual or 
quarterly data, which is largely motivated by the low variation in the explanatory variables over 
short periods of time (in particular, slow changes in the ownership structure and differential 
characteristics of dual class stock). The reference period between mid-February and mid-March 
was chosen for the ease of controlling for dividend differences. This period directly precedes the 
ex-dividend dates in most companies (these are normally in April or May), so the expected 
annual dividends from the previous financial year are likely to be almost fully reflected in the 
current prices of shares. Thus, assuming that the market anticipates future dividends correctly, 
share prices may be adjusted for the actual dividends that will be paid ex post. The considerable 
length of the reference period, i.e. seven weeks, is motivated by the necessity to increase the 
number of observations: the longer the time frame, the larger the number of companies whose 
common  and  preferred  shares  are  traded  at  least  once  within  the  period.  An  obvious 
shortcoming of expanding the time frame is that the difference in average-over-the-period prices 
of the two classes of stock may be less informative, especially when one class of shares is 
traded at the beginning of a period characterized by large changes of share prices while the other 
class – at the end of the period.  
Constructed along these lines, the sample embraces 99 companies in nine time periods 
with 341 observations in total, of which 313 observations (corresponding to 71 companies) form 
an unbalanced panel. The number of observations per year is small (the maximum is 52 in 1998, 
the minimum is 13 in 1999) which prevents sensible econometric analyses based on separate 
cross-sections and restricts the flexibility of modelling in the panel setup (e.g., by allowing for 
time-varying coefficients). On the other hand, the panel nature of the data permits accounting 
for  unobserved  characteristics  of  firms  as  long  as  relevant  unobservables  can  be  regarded 
constant within the period spanned by the panel.  
Almost all data used in this study are publicly available in the Internet. As regards share 
prices and other information about trading in the RTS, they are accessible from the RTS web-
site (http://www.rts.ru). Company data can be found in the quarterly reports to the Federal 
Commission  on  the  Securities  Market  (FCSM)  and  are  downloadable  from  its  web-site   13
(http://disclosure.fcsm.ru). Since quarterly reports are available starting from 1998 at best, other 
sources such as company annual reports and information from the Skate financial press agency 
were used to fill in the missing data (primarily on ownership).   
 
Modelling issues and econometric specification 
Based on the theoretical considerations discussed above, the general functional relationship can 
be expressed in the following way:  
VP = F (p, Ф, B/y, Expr, DLiq),                  (3) 
where VP is a premium on common shares, p, Ф, B/y are the variables in the control contest 
model of the voting premium (2), Expr is a measure of the expropriation risk facing preferred 
shareholders,  and  DLiq  is  a  measure  of  relative  liquidity  of  preferred  shares.  This  model 
contains  several  variables  that  cannot  be  measured  directly  and  for  which  there  are  no 
conventional proxies. Thus, the exact specification depends on the ability to resolve a number of 
measurement issues. 
Probability of a control contest There is no straightforward way to obtain the value of 
the Ф factor. Rydqvist (1987) was the first to use a modified version of the Shapley value 
(Milnor and Shapley, 1978) as a proxy, followed by Zingales (1994), Robinson et al. (1995), 
and Chung and Kim (1999), among others. If approximated by the Shapley value, Ф equals zero 
when one individual owns more than 50 percent of the votes; is small when one investor owns a 
substantial but still minority fraction of votes and no others wield any significant block; and 
increases dramatically when two shareholders own large fractions of votes and the pivotal votes 
are distributed among small shareholders. The Ф factor, when approximated by the Shapley 
value,  proves  to  be  a  statistically  significant  explanatory  variable  in  all  mentioned  studies. 
However, the theoretical foundations of the Shapley value are not unquestionable (Zingales, 
1995)  and  other  proxies  for  the  probability  of  a  contested  takeover  may  be  warranted. 
Alternative measures include, for example, a dummy equal to unity if one shareholder owns a 
majority of stock and zero otherwise and a dummy equal to unity if there are at least two large   14
shareholders  but  neither  has  a  majority  of  votes  (Zingales,  1994);  a  vector  of  variables 
comprising ownership (the fraction of votes held by insiders), size (measured as the logarithm 
of the market value of equity) and abnormal stock return (Smith and Amoako-Adu, 1995); 
ownership variables in Rydqvist (1996).  
The use of the Shapley value is problematic in the Russian context. One reason is that 
the majority of traded firms (88 percent in the sample) have controlling shareholders, which 
implies that the variable takes too many zero values and has little explanatory power. Perhaps 
more important, the Shapley value cannot be measured precisely since only the upper tail of the 
distribution  of  ownership in  each  company  is  known  (the  disclosure  cut-off  in  Russia  is 5 
percent). In addition, Leech (1988) shows that approximations of the Shapley value contain a 
significant error when the ownership stake of the largest shareholder exceeds 30 percent. But 
this is a typical case in Russia. Therefore, our analysis relies on other proxies of the probability 
of control contests. 
Another and related issue is whether the identity of the controlling shareholder should 
be taken into account. Given the large number of companies controlled by the state in the 1990s 
(either directly or through state holding companies) and efforts of the government to privatize 
state assets, it seems plausible that majority state ownership does not necessarily rule out the 
voting premium: the market may anticipate future privatizations which will eventually open up 
a space for a contest for control.  
Taking these considerations into account, in what follows the Ф factor is approximated 
by  
(a)  a dummy for no majority control (No_cont),  
(b)   a  dummy  for  no  majority  control  by  the  state  (including  other  state-owned 
companies,  No_stcont)  plus  a  dummy  for  no  majority  control  by  private 
shareholders (No_prcont),  
(c)   a dummy equal to unity if the largest shareholder in a company has less than 50 
percent of votes and the second largest one has more than 10 percent (variable 
Two),    15
(d)  the ownership stake of the largest shareholder (Owner1),  
(e)  the ownership stake of the largest and second largest shareholders (Owner1 and 
Owner2 ), 
(f)  the difference between the stakes of the two largest owners (Owner1-2). 
The intuition behind the last approximation is that the smaller the difference, the more 
valuable the votes of small shareholders, in particular if the company is not majority controlled. 
Private benefits Although private benefits of control cannot be measured directly, the 
assembled dataset provides a potential proxy for their relative size: a dummy which equals unity 
if a company has introduced its shares to the US stock market by issuing American Depository 
Receipts (ADR). The rationale is that a company that wants to issue ADR has to adhere to fairly 
strict disclosure rules in the US which may restrict the opportunities to extract private benefits 
of control. A more extensive discussion of the role of ADR in reducing private benefits of 
control  is  provided  in  Doidge  (2003).  Note  that  according  to  the  control  contest  model,  a 
reduction in the private benefits of control should affect the voting premium only in case of 
non-zero probability of a control fight; thus the ADR dummy needs to be interacted with the no 
control dummy. 
Expropriation risks facing non-voting shareholders There is no perfect measure of the 
risk of expropriation of preferred shareholders as a class. Yet the vetoing power of preferred 
shareholders may serve as a proxy: when changes in the corporate charter that concern preferred 
shareholders require (super)majority approval by them, the risk of expropriation presumably 
becomes lower. A dummy variable for the vetoing power is constructed; it equals unity for all 
companies starting from 2002 when the vetoing power of preferred shareholders was instituted 
into the corporate law. 
Liquidity Since measuring liquidity of the two classes of stock on the basis of the 
volume of trade or the number of transactions may be ambiguous, this study uses the spread-
based approach to assess liquidity:  
Liq = (pricea – priceb)/pricea,             (4)   16
where pricea and priceb denote the ask and bid prices (closure) on the 1
st of March each year or 
on the nearest trading date in case the stock exchange was closed on the 1
st of March. Defined 
this way, the variable takes any value in the (0; 1) interval and measures illiquidity: the larger 
the value, the lower liquidity of the respective class of shares. The relative liquidity measure is 
defined as the difference between the estimated liquidities of the two classes, Liqc and Liqp:  
DLiq= Liqc – Liqp.              (5) 
 
Dividend differences Controlling for dividend differences between the two classes of 
stock  represents  a challenge  in the empirical  analysis:  dividends  on common  and  preferred 
shares typically differ; moreover, they are not functionally dependent on each other. This study 
uses a current period difference in dividends divided by the price of preferred share as a control 
variable in the regression: 
DDiv = (divp – divc)/pricep.             (6) 
Note that this correction is imperfect: while accounting for dividend differences in the current 
period,  the  variable  cannot  account  for  future  differences  that  may  be  expected  by  market 
participants and may therefore be reflected in share prices.  
Another variable relevant for controlling for differences in dividend entitlements is a 
dummy variable for adherence to the 10 percent dividend rule. 
  Our  basic  specification  (with  probability  of  control  contest  proxied  by  no  control 
dummy) is the following: 
VPit =  b1No_contrit + b2ADR_No_contrit + b3DLiqit + b4Vetoit +  
+ b5 Convit + b6Voteit  + b7DDivit + b8Div10it + dt  + ui + eit ,                     (7) 
where the dependent variable VP is a premium on common shares, No_contr is a dummy for no 
control, ADR_No_contr stands for ADR dummy interacted with No_contr dummy, DLiq is a 
measure of relative liquidity of the two classes of stock, Veto is a dummy for the vetoing power 
of preferred shareholders, Conv is a dummy for convertibility of preferred shares, Vote is a 
dummy for temporary enfranchisement of preferred stock, DDiv is a variable capturing dividend   17
differences, Div10 is a dummy for the 10 percent dividend rule, d is a time effect, u is firm-
specific effect and e is a random disturbance. Descriptive statistics of all variables are reported 
in Table 3 and Table 4. 
Note that (7) omits the variable reflecting the fraction of voting stock in company equity 
because this variable has a very low variation across firms and over time with most of the 
sampled firms having their equity split between common and preferred stock in the proportion 
of 75 to 25 percent (due to the specifics of the privatization regulations of the 1990s).  
The above formulation (7) is an individual effects model with different time intercepts. 
Inclusion of the latter is a standard practice in econometric analysis involving short panels and 
is  applied  to  capture  aggregate  time  effects  that  have  the  same  influence  on  all  units 
(Wooldridge, 2002; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Firm effects u are allowed for in (7) even 
though the theories explaining the premium provide no clear rationale for them; in fact, it may 
be argued that our analysis focuses on the difference in prices of similar instruments (shares of 
the two classes) of same firms and since many characteristics of firms, whether observed or not, 
affect these prices in similar ways, many idiosyncrasies are differenced away. In what follows, 
the issue as to whether firm effects should be modelled or not is resolved via specification tests.  
Models of type (7) can be estimated using the fixed effects (FE), random effects (RE) or 
pooled OLS estimators. The differences between these three can be summarized as follows. 
Pooled OLS is appropriate in case of no unobserved heterogeneity among firms, it also remains 
consistent  if  the  true  model  is  RE  (the  crucial  condition  for  which  is  uncorrelatedness  of 
unobserved effects with any of the explanatory variables). The fixed effects estimator allows for 
arbitrary  correlation  between  the  unobserved  effects  and  the  regressors  and  is  consistent 
regardless of whether the true model is FE, RE or pooled OLS. Importantly, both pooled OLS 
and RE are inconsistent in case the true model is FE (see, e.g., Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). In 
what follows, the choice between these models is made on the basis of statistical tests (Hausman 
test and Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects).    
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Estimation results 
The main empirical results are shown in Table 5, Table 6 and Table 7; Table 8 shows results for 
two sub-samples covering two periods: 1997-2001 and 2002-2005. Each specification reported 
in Table 5, Table 6 and Table 7 (they differ by proxies for the probability of control contest) is 
estimated using the FE, RE and pooled OLS estimators. The pooled OLS estimates are based on 
the full sample embracing 341 observations; the other estimators are applied to the unbalanced 
panel  consisting  of  313  observations.
9  For  each  specification,  the  F-test  for  fixed  effects, 
Hausman test and Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects are reported. 
In  all  regressions,  standard  errors  are  corrected  for  heteroscedasticity  and  serial  correlation 
within clusters (firms).  
The results from applying the three estimators to model 1, which proxies the probability 
of  control  contest  by  the  dummy  for  no  control,  are  reported  in  Table  5.  Among  these 
estimators, the diagnostics tests favour pooled OLS. In particular, the Hausman test does not 
reject the null that the RE estimates are not statistically different from the FE estimates; this is 
normally  interpreted  as  evidence  that  there  are  no  unobserved  effects  correlated  with 
explanatory variables, so the RE estimator is consistent. Next, the Breusch and Pagan LM test 
for random effects does not reject the null that variation of unobserved effects is zero.  
According to the OLS results, the coefficient on the dummy for no control is positive, 
which is consistent with the control contest model, but significant at the 10 percent level only. 
The coefficient on the ADR dummy interacted with the dummy for no control also has the 
expected  negative  sign  indicating  that  ADR  issue  reduces  the  price  differential.
10  The 
coefficients  on  the  liquidity  difference  measure,  convertibility  dummy  and  the  10  percent 
dividend  rule  dummy  are  all  significant  and  have  expected  signs.
11  The  coefficient  on  the 
differential dividend variable has the expected negative sign but is only significant at the 10 
percent  level  in  the  OLS  estimation.  The  proxies  for  expropriation  risk  and  temporary 
enfranchisement are insignificant. Note that a bulk of variation in the dependent variable is 
explained by time dummies.     19
Model 2 is intended to check as to whether the premium depends on the identity of the 
controlling owner and for this purpose it differentiates between control by private entities and 
that of the state. The underlying hypothesis is that the premium on common shares is larger in 
companies that are controlled by the state – future privatizations may dramatically alter control 
structures  in  these  firms.  The  specification  tests  again  give  preference  to  the  pooled  OLS 
estimator.
12 The coefficients on the dummy variables for no control by the state and for no 
control by private entities are positive with the former being significant at the 10 percent level, 
but not statistically different from each other. Hence, there is no support for the hypothesis that 
majority control by the state means higher probability of a control contest. All other coefficients 
do not change much when compared with model 1. 
Model 3 uses a dummy variable for the presence of two large shareholders neither of 
which has 50 percent of votes. In this specification, the Hausman test is somewhat inconclusive: 
the coefficients from the FE and RE estimators are different at the 10 percent level, although not 
at the 5 percent level. The coefficients on the proxies for the probability of control contest and 
for the relative value of private benefits are statistically insignificant in the FE estimation, but 
significant in the both pooled OLS and RE estimation. A general problem with the FE estimator 
in this study is that the within variation of many explanatory variables is quite small, so the 
coefficients are estimated on the basis of a handful of observations at best.  
Models 4, 5 and 6 proxy the probability of control contest by continuous variables – the 
stake of the largest shareholder, the stakes of the two largest shareholders and the difference 
between these stakes. With continuous proxies, the diagnostics tests favour the RE model: the 
Hausman test is passed while the Breusch and Pagan test for random effects does not reject 
heterogeneity  of  unobserved  effects  at  the  5  percent  level.  In  these  specifications,  the 
coefficients on the control contest proxies are significant at the 5 percent level (10 percent in the 
FE model), while the coefficients on other regressors change little compared with model 1.  
In particular, Model 4 shows that the premium is negatively related to the ownership 
stake of the largest shareholder (variable Owner1) – a one percentage point increase in the 
ownership stake of the largest shareholder reduces the premium by 0.9 percentage points. It has   20
been tested at to whether this relationship depends on whether a company is majority-controlled 
or not: the ownership stake of the largest shareholder is interacted with the control dummy and 
the resulting variable is included in the model (this specification is not reported). There is little 
evidence of a non-linear relationship: the coefficient on the product of the two variables has the 
expected negative sign (consistent with the hypothesis that concentration of ownership in the 
hands of the largest owner matters more if the company is not majority controlled) but is not 
statistically significant. 
Model  5  provides  a  test  of  whether  the  ownership  stake  of  the  second  largest 
shareholder (Owner2 variable), in addition to the ownership of the largest one, matters for the 
magnitude of the premium. The control contest model predicts that the higher the fraction of 
shares held by the second largest owner, the higher the chance of a control contest, especially if 
a  firm  is  not  majority  owned.  Alternatively,  the  second  largest  shareholder  may  restrict 
opportunities of the largest owner to extract private benefits. It turns out in Model 5 that the 
coefficient on the variable of interest is statistically insignificant. Adding the interaction of the 
stake of the second largest shareholder with the dummy for no control (the second largest stake 
may have more importance in case of no majority control) changes things little, with the new 
variable being statistically insignificant (this specification is not reported).   
Model  6  proxies the  probability  of  a  control contest  by  the  difference  between  the 
ownership stakes of the largest shareholder and the second largest one (variable Owners1-2). 
The underlying assumption is that the closer the fractions of shares held by the two largest 
shareholders,  the  higher  the  probability  of  a  fight  for  control.  Hence,  the  premium  should 
increase when the difference becomes smaller resulting in a balance of power between the two 
largest shareholders. This hypothesis is not rejected by the data: the coefficient on the variable 
of  interest  is  negative  and  statistically  significant  (at  5  percent  level)  –  increasing  the 
discrepancy between the ownership stakes of the two largest shareholders by one percentage 
point reduces the premium by about 0.65 percentage points. Similar to the previous findings, 
with different proxies for the probability of control contest, this result holds for all companies 
regardless of the presence of controlling owners. This hints on the importance of significant   21
minority ownership stakes. Overall, the results concerning the second largest shareholders can 
be rationalized if large minority investors have bargaining power and enjoy private benefits 
regardless of whether the company is majority controlled or not (this interpretation is suggested 
by Nicodano, 1998). For example, if a minority shareholder has a representative in the corporate 
board (this is not unlikely given that the boards in Russia are elected by cumulative voting), he 
may affect corporate decisions that require unanimous approval by the board. 
Similar to Models 1-3, in Models 4-6 we find evidence of a significant effect of the 
issue of ADR on the premium. Differences in liquidity, convertibility of preferred stock and 
differences  in  dividends  (measured  by  the  10  percent  dividend  dummy)  are  statistically 
significant  factors  in  these  models.  There  is  no  support  for  the  hypothesis  that  the  price 
differential  is  driven  by  the  risk  of  expropriation  of  preferred  shareholders  as  a  class:  the 
coefficient  on  the  respective  proxy  variable  has  the  expected  sign,  but  is  statistically 
insignificant.  
In order to address the question of whether the estimated relationships change over 
time, we run regressions for two sub-samples of the original sample, covering data from 1997-
2001 and 2002-2005 respectively. The first period covers the initial stage of the development of 
the  Russian  stock  market,  marked  by  August  1998  financial  crisis  and  long  stagnation 
thereafter, while 2002-2005 is a period characterized by improved shareholder protection and 
robust growth of the market. Importantly, the sample is divided into two nearly equal parts with 
178 and 163 observations, respectively. 
Table 8 shows estimation results (obtained from OLS) for the models that contain the 
dummy  for  no  control,  dummy  for  two  large  shareholders  and  the  variable  measuring  the 
difference in the ownership stakes of the two largest shareholders as proxies for the probability 
of control contest. In the second sub-sample, the coefficients on Veto and Conv variables cannot 
be identified: the dummy for convertibility equals unity for one observation only (thus, the 
variable is dropped and the observation is excluded) and there is no variation in Veto variable as 
the vetoing power of preferred shareholders applied to all companies (it was instituted in the law 
in 2002).    22
In both sub-samples, there is evidence in favour of the control contest model, although 
it  is  rather  weak.  Collinearity  of  regressors  is  visible  in  the  second  sub-sample  (variables 
No_contr  and  ADR_No_contr).  The  two  important  differences  between  the  estimates  from 
1997-2001 and 2002-2005 are the effect of liquidity (which is only significant in the earlier 
period) and the effect of differential dividends (which is more pronounced in the later period). 
As regards the effect of liquidity, it presumably has to do with the illiquidity of preferred shares 
stemming from the initial allocation of them in negligible fractions among company employees, 
which made these shares virtually non-tradable for a long time. The purchase of these shares 
from employees – which was necessary to build up standard tradable lots – took considerable 
time. In contrast, large fractions of common stock were sold during the process of privatization 
to institutional investors at voucher and money auctions, which encouraged trading activity in 
the  market.  As  regards  the  effect  of  differential  dividends  in the two  periods,  the  result is 
consistent with the observation from the early period of the development of the Russian stock 
market that share prices hardly adjusted for the value of dividends when the ex-dividend date 
passed (Securities Market, 2001).  
 
Conclusion 
This  study  has  found  evidence  of  the  validity  of  the  control  contest  model  of  the  voting 
premium for explaining the price differential between common and preferred shares in Russia. 
The  model  is  supported  in  most  specifications  regardless  of  the  choice  of  proxies  for  the 
probability  of  control  contests.  The  evidence  from  the  specifications  that  use  continuous 
measures  of  ownership  is  somewhat  stronger  than  from  the  specifications  relying  on  more 
conventional proxies by majority control dummies. In particular, we find that the larger the 
difference between the ownership stakes of the largest and second largest shareholders, the 
smaller the premium.  
Additional support for the control contest model comes from the effect of ADR issue on 
the premium. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that the issue of ADR reduces   23
private  benefits  of  control  in  companies  that  are  not  majority  owned.  The  effect  is  non-
negligible from the economic viewpoint: the issue of ADR reduces the premium on common 
shares by about 35 percentage points on average.  
Our empirical analysis does not provide any evidence in favour of the expropriation 
hypothesis. However, this result is hardly sufficient to claim that the expropriation of preferred 
shareholders is irrelevant; it may well be the case that a dummy for the vetoing power of 
preferred shareholders is a bad proxy for such expropriation.  
The difference in liquidity of the two classes of stock turns out to be an important 
determinant of the premium in 1997-2001, the early period of the development of the Russian 
stock market, but not in 2002-2005.  
As regards other differential characteristics of the dual class shares, there is evidence 
that the magnitude of the premium was influenced by the differences in dividends; this effect 
was more pronounced in 2002-2005, relative to 1997-2001. The convertibility option mattered a 
great deal, but this result is expected and trivial from the economic viewpoint. There is no 
evidence to suggest that enfranchisement of preferred shares had any effect on the premium. 
Overall, the  main  contribution  of this  study  is  that  it  confirmed  the  validity  of  the 
control  contest  model  of  the  voting  premium  in  the  emerging  market  of  Russia,  which  is 
interesting  as  the  dual  class  structure  of  company  equity  in  the  country  was  imposed 
exogenously by privatization regulations. By showing that the premium is systematically related 
to the factors suggested by the theory, the study left fewer reasons to label it as being puzzling. 
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Notes 
1 Hereafter the premium is defined as the difference between the price of common shares and the price of 
preferred ones divided by the price of preferred shares.  
2 RTS stands for the Russian Trading System, the first electronic trading system in Russia established in 
September 1995, and transformed into RTS Stock Exchange in 1997.   
3 Non-voting shares are usually issued in order to raise funds without jeopardizing control over the firm; 
thus, the decision to issue such stock is likely to be related to the size of the benefits of control. 
4 This is a compressed version of the description provided in Muravyev (2004). 
5 By 1998 about one-half of the companies that had issued preferred shares eliminated the rule on the 
vetoing power of preferred shareholders from their charters (Securities Market, 1998). The reasons for 
retaining or removing this rule are not clear: for example, most regional telecommunication companies 
did abolish the rule (a famous exception is MGTS – Moscow City Telephone Company) while most 
regional power utilities preserved it. Interestingly, the regional companies in both sectors are majority 
controlled by state holdings – Svyazinvest and Unified Energy Systems respectively. 
6 The theory suggests that incentives for expropriation increase with the gap between the control rights 
and  the  cash-flow  rights  as  first  shown  by  Jensen  and  Meckling  (1976).  Hence,  a  link  between 
expropriation and firm-specific characteristics such as the distribution of ownership, the size of assets 
under control, etc. On the country level, expropriation seems to be strongly influenced by the institutional 
and economic environment. For example, it has been argued that the incentives to expropriate tend to rise 
in  bad  states  of  nature  when  the  opportunities  of  raising  additional  funds  in  the  market  are  limited 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Recent papers that exploit the legal approach to corporate governance show 
that private benefits of control depend on the legal norms protecting minority shareholders and on the 
quality of law enforcement in a particular jurisdiction (see, e.g., La Porta et al. 1999; Johnson et al., 2000) 
as well as on a number of extra legal institutions such as competition, internal norms, pressure from 
labour, media diffusion, and tax enforcement (Dyck and Zingales, 2002).  
7 The traditional measure is the ratio of the volume of transactions (in terms of money) to the average 
absolute percentage change in price. Instead of the measures based on the volume of trade, liquidity may 
be proxied by the number of transactions; the spread between the ask and bid prices; the number of days 
between the end of the month and the day of the previous recorded transaction, etc. 
8 Preferred stock appeared in the RTS only in September 1996. It is possible to use earlier data from over-
the-counter market, but only at the cost of loosing liquidity information. 
9 Pooled OLS results stay virtually the same if the estimator is applied to the unbalanced panel rather than 
the full sample. 
10 ADR dummy, if included, is statistically insignificant and changes the reported results little. This is true 
of this specification and of all those reported below. 
11 The definition of the liquidity difference variable assumes that liquidity of common stock affects the 
premium with the same magnitude as liquidity of preferred stock, only the sign is the opposite. If separate 
measures  of  liquidity  of  the  two  classes  of  stock  are  used  instead  of  the  composite  variable,  the 
coefficients on both variables have opposite signs (negative for common shares and positive for preferred 
shares) and are usually statistically significant. However, as the F-test does not reject the hull H0: liqc=-
liqp,  the  composite  variable  for  liquidity  differences  is  justified  and  given  the  small  number  of 
observations should be preferred as resulting in a more parsimonious model. 
12 Note that in the FE model, the coefficient on the variable for no control by the state, No_stcont, is 
estimated on two observations only: two of the sampled firms were privatized in the early 2000s. This 
illustrates the problem of using the FE estimator when the within variation in data is small.  
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 Table 1. Common and preferred share prices of Surgutneftegaz, Unified Energy Systems and Rostelecom, USD* 
 
Company     1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Surgutneftegaz  common  0.58  0.15  0.07  0.29  0.24  0.34  0.32  0.65  0.83 
(SNGS)  preferred  0.39  0.09  0.02  0.11  0.11  0.21  0.23  0.45  0.65 
   premium, percent  50   74   282   175   113   59   36   44   28  
Unified Energy   common  0.14  0.25  0.03  0.14  0.09  0.17  0.12  0.325  0.306 
Systems  preferred  0.1  0.17  0.01  0.06  0.04  0.13  0.1  0.3  0.285 
 (EESR)  premium, percent  34   48   129   155   154   34   20   8   7  
Rostelecom  common  2.9  2.96  0.75  2.54  1.01  1.03  1.23  2.43  2.13 
(RTKM)  preferred  2.24  2.1  0.28  0.8  0.42  0.53  0.83  1.7  1.62 
   premium, percent  30   41   170   219   139   94   49   43   31  
* Weighted-average prices as of January each year, data from the RTS Stock Exchange. 
 
 
Table 2. Dividends per common and preferred shares of Surgutneftegaz, Unified Energy Systems and Rostelecom, USD* 
 
Company     1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Surgutneftegaz  common  0.0062  0.0012  0.0004  0.0007  0.0014  0.0011  0.001  0.0049  0.0144 
(SNGS)  preferred  0.0229  0.0043  0.0004  0.003  0.0063  0.0032  0.003  0.0056  0.0219 
   com. to pr., percent  27   27   100   23   23   33   33   88   66  
Unified Energy   common  0.0009  0.0008  0.0003  0.0005  0.0007  0.0008  0.0011  0.0016  0.0020 
Systems  preferred  0.0009  0.0015  0.0007  0.0013  0.0026  0.0038  0.0092  0.0080  0.0081 
 (EESR)  com. to pr., percent  100   55   41   36   27   22   12   21   25  
Rostelecom  common  0  0.0135  0  0.0057  0.0057  0.0069  0.0171  0.0308  0.0527 
(RTKM)  preferred  0.0837  0.0945  0  0.0282  0.0148  0.0297  0.0402  0.1141  0.1074 
   com. to pr., percent  0   14   n/a  20   39   23   43   27   49  
* Dividends from the last financial year to be paid in the current year, Rouble values adjusted using USD/RUR exchange rates as of March 1. 
 Figure 1. Dynamics of the premium for Surgutneftegaz, Rostelecom and Unified Energy 
Systems and the RTS Stock Exchange index 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics: means of variables 
year  N obs  VP  π  No_cont  No_stcont  No_prcont  Two  Owner1  Owner2  Owner1-2 
1997  37  0.56  0.78  0.11  0.30  0.81  0.11  0.52  0.10  0.43 
1998  52  1.40  0.78  0.13  0.25  0.88  0.10  0.52  0.11  0.40 
1999  13  1.78  0.82  0.31  0.54  0.77  0.15  0.46  0.16  0.29 
2000  38  2.12  0.79  0.18  0.29  0.89  0.13  0.49  0.13  0.36 
2001  38  1.37  0.79  0.18  0.29  0.89  0.11  0.52  0.14  0.38 
2002  47  0.80  0.78  0.09  0.19  0.89  0.06  0.55  0.14  0.41 
2003  37  0.75  0.80  0.11  0.30  0.81  0.08  0.58  0.13  0.45 
2004  47  0.50  0.81  0.04  0.26  0.79  0.04  0.61  0.15  0.47 
2005  32  0.45  0.81  0.06  0.31  0.75  0.06  0.61  0.14  0.47 




year  N obs  Liqc  Liqp   Liq  ADR  Ddiff  Div10  Veto  Vote  Conv 
1997  37  0.14  0.18  -0.03  0.08  0.05  1.00  0.35  0.03  0.03 
1998  52  0.18  0.28  -0.1  0.19  0.08  0.96  0.35  0.06  0.04 
1999  13  0.29  0.42  -0.14  0.46  0.05  0.85  0.31  0.00  0.08 
2000  38  0.19  0.33  -0.14  0.47  0.07  0.95  0.29  0.16  0.03 
2001  38  0.23  0.27  -0.04  0.42  0.12  0.92  0.39  0.11  0.05 
2002  47  0.15  0.17  -0.02  0.38  0.03  0.96  1.00  0.06  0.02 
2003  37  0.12  0.14  -0.02  0.46  0.02  0.89  1.00  0.19  0.00 
2004  47  0.12  0.14  -0.02  0.38  0.01  0.87  1.00  0.15  0.00 
2005  32  0.09  0.12  -0.02  0.50  0.01  0.84  1.00  0.03  0.00 
Total  341  0.16  0.21  -0.05  0.36  0.05  0.92  0.66  0.09  0.02 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics of variables: overall, between and within variation 
Variable    Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
VP  overall  1.03  0.85  -0.14  4.77 
  between    0.72  0.05  4.77 
  within    0.66  -0.98  3.43 
π  overall  0.79  0.06  0.75  0.96 
  between    0.06  0.75  0.96 
  within    0.01  0.71  0.90 
No_cont  overall  0.12  0.33  0.00  1.00 
  between    0.31  0.00  1.00 
  within    0.12  -0.75  0.92 
No_stcont  overall  0.28  0.45  0.00  1.00 
  between    0.46  0.00  1.00 
  within    0.10  -0.29  0.90 
No_prcont  overall  0.84  0.37  0.00  1.00 
  between    0.36  0.00  1.00 
  within    0.16  -0.03  1.64 
Two  overall  0.09  0.28  0  1 
  between    0.27  0  1 
  within    0.14  -0.71  0.87 
Owner1  overall  0.55  0.12  0.13  0.91 
  between    0.13  0.14  0.90 
  within    0.05  0.28  0.83 
Owner2  overall  0.13  0.07  0.04  0.35 
  between    0.06  0.04  0.33 
  within    0.04  -0.01  0.29 
Owner1-2  overall  0.42  0.16  0.01  0.87 
  between    0.16  0.01  0.85 
  within    0.07  0.11  0.72 
 Liq  overall  -0.05  0.16  -0.81  0.38 
  between    0.16  -0.64  0.32 
  within    0.11  -0.73  0.33 
ADR  overall  0.36  0.48  0  1 
  between    0.35  0  1 
  within    0.25  -0.53  0.91 
Ddiff  overall  0.05  0.08  0  0.58 
  between    0.05  0  0.23 
  within    0.07  -0.18  0.41 
Div10  overall  0.92  0.27  0  1 
  between    0.28  0  1 
  within    0.07  0.67  1.67 
Veto  overall  0.66  0.48  0  1 
  between    0.42  0  1 
  within    0.30  -0.14  1.46 
Vote  overall  0.09  0.29  0  1 
  between    0.22  0  1 
  within    0.23  -0.41  0.98 
Conv  overall  0.02  0.15  0  1 
  between    0.13  0  1 
  within    0.07  -0.78  0.82 
Number of observations is 341, number of groups is 99.   32
Table 5. Regression results 
Model  1  2 
VP  OLS  RE  FE  OLS  RE  FE 
No_cont  0.358  0.271  0.199       
  (0.203)  (0.191)  (0.148)       
No_stcont        0.367  0.303  0.554*  
        (0.206)  (0.202)  (0.246)   
No_prcont        0.326  0.210  0.194   
        (0.207)  (0.182)  (0.144)   
ADR*No_cont  -0.499*  -0.394*  -0.201  -0.494*  -0.391*  -0.211   
  (0.209)  (0.198)  (0.257)  (0.208)  (0.195)  (0.254)   
 Liq  -1.331**  -1.353**  -1.186**  -1.336**  -1.363**  -1.213**  
  (0.298)  (0.338)  (0.432)  (0.301)  (0.341)  (0.430)   
Veto  -0.096  -0.066  -0.155  -0.096  -0.069  -0.194   
  (0.133)  (0.133)  (0.155)  (0.132)  (0.132)  (0.154)   
Conv  -1.608**  -1.510**  -1.175**  -1.624**  -1.540**  -1.179**  
  (0.171)  (0.189)  (0.317)  (0.182)  (0.206)  (0.307)   
Vote  0.136  0.123  0.049  0.134  0.119  0.019   
  (0.143)  (0.143)  (0.157)  (0.144)  (0.143)  (0.152)   
Ddiff  -1.120  -0.962  -0.616  -1.101  -0.922  -0.522   
  (0.657)  (0.698)  (0.835)  (0.662)  (0.702)  (0.820)   
Div10  -0.270**  -0.273**  -0.687**  -0.254**  -0.234*  -0.524**  
  (0.085)  (0.091)  (0.121)  (0.094)  (0.102)  (0.153)   
Y1997  -0.888**  -0.882**  -0.825**  -0.891**  -0.884**  -0.826**  
  (0.166)  (0.184)  (0.224)  (0.166)  (0.184)  (0.224)   
Y1998  -0.109  -0.167  -0.137  -0.109  -0.170  -0.142   
  (0.177)  (0.182)  (0.206)  (0.177)  (0.182)  (0.205)   
Y1999  0.221  0.290  0.486  0.217  0.286  0.472   
  (0.265)  (0.279)  (0.346)  (0.268)  (0.282)  (0.346)   
Y2000  0.518**  0.481**  0.570**  0.518**  0.479**  0.570**  
  (0.172)  (0.165)  (0.186)  (0.172)  (0.165)  (0.185)   
Y2002  -0.597**  -0.661**  -0.581**  -0.596**  -0.660**  -0.562**  
  (0.201)  (0.196)  (0.199)  (0.20)  (0.195)  (0.199)   
Y2003  -0.735**  -0.756**  -0.655**  -0.736**  -0.758**  -0.650**  
  (0.220)  (0.218)  (0.230)  (0.219)  (0.218)  (0.228)   
Y2004  -0.961**  -0.988**  -0.893**  -0.962**  -0.989**  -0.888**  
  (0.225)  (0.222)  (0.232)  (0.225)  (0.221)  (0.231)   
Y2005  -1.022**  -1.082**  -1.008**  -1.024**  -1.085**  -1.007**  
  (0.230)  (0.228)  (0.240)  (0.229)  (0.228)  (0.239)   
intcpt  1.776**  1.795**  2.135**  1.427**  1.533**  1.712**  
  (0.170)  (0.179)  (0.210)  (0.254)  (0.252)  (0.285)   
R-sq  0.565  0.572  0.539  0.566  0.573  0.519   
No. obs.  341  313  313  341  313  313    
Diagnostics             
F test for FE      1.87 (0.0003)      1.87 (0.0003) 
Hausman test      22.61 (0.1244)      6.97 (0.9840) 
LM test for RE    2.01 (0.1565)      1.74 (0.1866)   
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Table 6. Regression results 
Model  3  4 
VP  OLS  RE  FE  OLS  RE  FE 
Two  0.342  0.259  0.083                   
  (0.179)  (0.167)  (0.195)                   
Owner1        -0.904*  -0.926*  -1.090 
        (0.404)  (0.383)  (0.604) 
ADR*No_cont  -0.372*  -0.291*  -0.020  -0.373*  -0.346*  -0.202 
  (0.145)  (0.135)  (0.204)  (0.146)  (0.139)  (0.199) 
 Liq  -1.327**  -1.360**  -1.184**  -1.327**  -1.326**  -1.129* 
  (0.295)  (0.335)  (0.439)  (0.292)  (0.338)  (0.441) 
Veto  -0.095  -0.072  -0.149  -0.045  -0.019  -0.116 
  (0.133)  (0.135)  (0.155)  (0.133)  (0.132)  (0.153) 
Conv  -1.535**  -1.452**  -1.121**  -1.525**  -1.477**  -1.090** 
  (0.157)  (0.183)  (0.342)  (0.170)  (0.177)  (0.353) 
Vote  0.123  0.113  0.046  0.162  0.139  0.048 
  (0.142)  (0.143)  (0.158)  (0.142)  (0.141)  (0.156) 
Ddiff  -1.036  -0.895  -0.595  -1.062  -0.937  -0.603 
  (0.667)  (0.710)  (0.847)  (0.653)  (0.692)  (0.839) 
Div10  -0.308**  -0.293**  -0.690**  -0.268**  -0.263**  -0.658** 
  (0.084)  (0.085)  (0.123)  (0.090)  (0.10)  (0.112) 
Y1997  -0.90**  -0.894**  -0.826**  -0.894**  -0.888**  -0.829** 
  (0.167)  (0.185)  (0.223)  (0.163)  (0.181)  (0.223) 
Y1998  -0.111  -0.172  -0.138  -0.116  -0.173  -0.146 
  (0.177)  (0.183)  (0.205)  (0.173)  (0.179)  (0.202) 
Y1999  0.240  0.292  0.484  0.209  0.268  0.488 
  (0.264)  (0.279)  (0.349)  (0.269)  (0.282)  (0.347) 
Y2000  0.517**  0.475**  0.562**  0.503**  0.463**  0.561** 
  (0.170)  (0.165)  (0.184)  (0.170)  (0.165)  (0.183) 
Y2002  -0.604**  -0.663**  -0.588**  -0.620**  -0.673**  -0.599** 
  (0.201)  (0.197)  (0.199)  (0.198)  (0.195)  (0.196) 
Y2003  -0.739**  -0.757**  -0.662**  -0.727**  -0.752**  -0.651** 
  (0.220)  (0.219)  (0.229)  (0.217)  (0.218)  (0.229) 
Y2004  -0.975**  -0.997**  -0.906**  -0.946**  -0.978**  -0.888** 
  (0.224)  (0.221)  (0.229)  (0.219)  (0.219)  (0.228) 
Y2005  -1.040**  -1.092**  -1.020**  -0.999**  -1.059**  -1.001** 
  (0.228)  (0.227)  (0.238)  (0.224)  (0.226)  (0.238) 
intcpt  1.818**  1.823**  2.145**  2.267**  2.294**  2.708** 
  (0.174)  (0.180)  (0.214)  (0.296)  (0.30)  (0.415) 
R-sq  0.565  0.572  0.534  0.567  0.575  0.540 
No. obs.  341  313  313  341  313  313 
Diagnostics             
F test for FE      1.85 (0.0004)      1.91 (0.0002) 
Hausman test      25.79 (0.0571)      13.97 (0.6007) 
LM test for RE    1.93 (0.1648)      4.38 (0.0363)     34
Table 7. Regression results 
Model  5  6 
VP  OLS  RE  FE  OLS  RE  FE 
Owner1  -0.870*  -0.862*  -1.056         
  (0.423)  (0.408)  (0.620)         
Owner2  0.151  0.306  0.379         
  (0.475)  (0.519)  (0.804)         
Owner1-2        -0.607*  -0.659*  -0.750   
        (0.276)  (0.261)  (0.440)   
ADR*No_cont  -0.371*  -0.344*  -0.169    -0.330*  -0.314*  -0.084   
  (0.147)  (0.138)  (0.196)    (0.129)  (0.123)  (0.185)   
 Liq  -1.331**  -1.339**  -1.144*   -1.359**  -1.366**  -1.170**  
  (0.293)  (0.341)  (0.446)    (0.293)  (0.335)  (0.442)   
Veto  -0.050  -0.026  -0.116    -0.073  -0.041  -0.123   
  (0.137)  (0.137)  (0.151)    (0.130)  (0.129)  (0.146)   
Conv  -1.519**  -1.465**  -1.060**   -1.491**  -1.444**  -1.045**  
  (0.168)  (0.176)  (0.381)    (0.154)  (0.167)  (0.373)   
Vote  0.158  0.133  0.043    0.146  0.126  0.040   
  (0.144)  (0.143)  (0.159)    (0.140)  (0.139)  (0.155)   
Ddiff  -1.059  -0.918  -0.571    -1.060  -0.903  -0.542   
  (0.656)  (0.699)  (0.852)    (0.662)  (0.705)  (0.852)   
Div10  -0.274**  -0.280*  -0.680**   -0.290**  -0.30**  -0.710**  
  (0.095)  (0.109)  (0.126)    (0.089)  (0.101)  (0.121)   
Y1997  -0.888**  -0.875**  -0.811**   -0.870**  -0.859**  -0.792**  
  (0.166)  (0.185)  (0.237)    (0.162)  (0.179)  (0.229)   
Y1998  -0.112  -0.166  -0.135    -0.101  -0.157  -0.123   
  (0.172)  (0.179)  (0.205)    (0.171)  (0.178)  (0.204)   
Y1999  0.206  0.264  0.481    0.20  0.260  0.474   
  (0.270)  (0.282)  (0.347)    (0.270)  (0.282)  (0.348)   
Y2000  0.504**  0.465**  0.561**   0.510**  0.468**  0.560**  
  (0.170)  (0.165)  (0.184)    (0.171)  (0.164)  (0.184)   
Y2002  -0.618**  -0.671**  -0.598**   -0.611**  -0.666**  -0.596**  
  (0.198)  (0.195)  (0.195)    (0.197)  (0.193)  (0.192)   
Y2003  -0.725**  -0.748**  -0.648**   -0.722**  -0.745**  -0.649**  
  (0.217)  (0.218)  (0.228)    (0.215)  (0.215)  (0.225)   
Y2004  -0.947**  -0.982**  -0.895**   -0.958**  -0.990**  -0.907**  
  (0.219)  (0.216)  (0.220)    (0.219)  (0.217)  (0.221)   
Y2005  -1.000**  -1.061**  -1.006**   -1.010**  -1.067**  -1.015**  
  (0.223)  (0.223)  (0.229)    (0.223)  (0.223)  (0.230)   
intcpt  2.234**  2.235**  2.653**   2.055**  2.101**  2.461**  
  (0.309)  (0.320)  (0.440)    (0.229)  (0.239)  (0.302)   
R-sq  0.567  0.575  0.539    0.565  0.574  0.536 
No. obs.  341  313  313     341  313  313    
Diagnostics             
F test for FE      1.90 (0.0002)      1.91 (0.0002) 
Hausman test      12.57 (0.7645)      6.39 (0.9834) 
LM test for RE    4.12 (0.0425)      3.99 (0.0457)     35
Table 8. OLS regressions results for the 1997-2001 and 2002-2005 sub-samples 
Model  1997-2001  2002-2005 
VP  1  2  3  4  5  6 
No_cont  0.251      0.608*     
   (0.189)      (0.275)     
Two    0.219      0.555**   
     (0.199)      (0.176)   
Owner1-2      -0.874*      -0.259 
       (0.385)      (0.216) 
ADR*No_cont  -0.358  -0.240  -0.325  -0.798**  -0.631**  -0.294** 
  (0.257)  (0.224)  (0.235)  (0.277)  (0.169)  (0.104) 
 Liq  -1.888**  -1.891**  -1.876**  -0.048  -0.033  -0.023 
  (0.377)  (0.372)  (0.378)  (0.265)  (0.266)  (0.261) 
Veto  -0.106  -0.109  -0.074       
  (0.144)  (0.145)  (0.137)       
Conv  -1.699**  -1.638**  -1.623**       
  (0.165)  (0.162)  (0.161)       
Vote  0.246  0.226  0.233  0.048  0.048  0.111 
  (0.282)  (0.280)  (0.277)  (0.081)  (0.083)  (0.097) 
Ddiff  -1.213  -1.146  -1.129  -2.150  -1.992  -1.926 
  (0.686)  (0.699)  (0.697)  (1.111)  (1.111)  (1.113) 
Div10  -0.181  -0.223  -0.207  -0.358**  -0.404**  -0.369** 
  (0.194)  (0.193)  (0.186)  (0.063)  (0.071)  (0.069) 
Y1997  -0.892**  -0.898**  -0.862**       
  (0.174)  (0.175)  (0.171)       
Y1998  -0.142  -0.141  -0.129       
  (0.178)  (0.178)  (0.172)       
Y1999  0.185  0.194  0.142       
  (0.258)  (0.257)  (0.267)       
Y2000  0.448*  0.449*  0.441*       
  (0.178)  (0.176)  (0.177)       
Y2003        -0.139  -0.136  -0.117 
        (0.072)  (0.072)  (0.077) 
Y2004        -0.370**  -0.384**  -0.374** 
        (0.071)  (0.069)  (0.070) 
Y2005        -0.434**  -0.451**  -0.427** 
        (0.078)  (0.075)  (0.081) 
intcpt  1.688**  1.732**  2.064**  1.216**  1.264**  1.343** 
   (0.224)  (0.228)  (0.289)  (0.078)  (0.080)  (0.126) 
              
R-sq  0.505  0.504  0.513  0.336  0.348  0.302 
No. obs.  178  178  178  162  162  162 
 
 
 
 